In the United States, charitable contributions can be deducted from taxable income making the price of giving inversely related to the marginal tax rate. The existing literature documents that charitable giving is very responsive to tax subsidies, but often ignores the spillover effects of such policies. On the other hand, a growing body of literature documents that giving to others reduces the stress and strengthens the immune system, which results in better health and longer life expectancy. These findings imply that tax subsidies for charitable giving may have positive spillover effects on health. This paper investigates this hypothesis using data from Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS), the philanthropy module of the Panel Study Income Dynamics (PSID). Understanding the spillover effects of charitable subsidies on health is quite important given the existing literature that links health status to several important economic outcomes. The results show that charitable subsidies have positive spillover effects on health. In particular, the implied cross-price elasticity of health index with respect to giving is −0.13. These results are robust to potential endogeneity of income and highlight the positive externalities created by tax subsidies for charitable giving.
According to the most recent estimate, the federal government is estimated to have 47 billion in foregone revenue in 2012 due to millions of households who will itemize charitable deductions in their federal tax returns (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2010). The economic rationales for providing tax subsidies for charitable contributions are well-documented. 1 The existing literature also documents that the amount of charitable contributions are very responsive to tax subsidies.
However, the indirect effects of charitable subsidies are relatively unknown. 2 In addition, recent studies in medicine and psychology document that giving to others leads to better health outcomes.
This finding implies that tax subsidies for charitable giving may have positive spillover effects on health. In this paper, I investigate this hypothesis using data from a unique survey that contains information on charitable giving and several different health outcomes.
Understanding more about the determinants of health is quite important since an extensive literature links health with several important economic outcomes. For instance, Bhargava et al.
(2001) and Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2001) show that health outcomes are associated with economic growth. Health is also a major determinant of several labor market outcomes. Grossman (1972) presents a model in which illness prevents work so that the cost of ill health is lost labor time. Stewart (2001) examines the impact of health status on the duration of unemployment spells and finds that individuals with impaired health will have significantly longer unemployment spells.
Several studies also document the significant relationship between health and educational outcomes such as school attendance, cognitive ability, and learning. In particular, Bils and Klenow (2000) document the positive effect of good health on investments in education at the national level. Bleakley (2003) finds that deworming of children in the American South had a positive impact on their educational achievements while in school, whereas Miguel and Kremer (2004) show that deworming of children in Kenya increased school attendance. Health is also linked with saving decisions and demographic outcomes. 3 Therefore, understanding the indirect effects of charitable subsidies on health and health related outcomes are important and findings from empirical analysis may help policymakers to make informed choices about the spillover effects of charitable subsidies. 1 Andreoni (2006) provides an extensive discussion of the relationship between charitable subsidies and giving. 2 An exception is a handful of studies which investigate the spillover effects of charitable subsidies on volunteering and religious attendance. See, for example, Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) , Brown and Lankford (1992) , Feldman (2010) , and Gruber (2004) . 3 Hurd, McFadden, and Gan (1998) show that increased expectation of longevity leads to greater wealth-holding at the household level in the United States. Using cross-country data, Bloom, Canning, and Graham (2003) find a positive effect of life expectancy on national savings. Schultz (1997) argue that reduced infant mortality, increased numbers of surviving children, and rising wages for women can lower desired fertility.
In order to investigate the relationship between charitable behavior and health, I use data from a household level survey which contains detailed information on charitable giving and several health outcomes for the household head: the philanthropy module of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). A major difficulty in identifying the relationship between charitable behavior and health is the two-way causality between these two outcomes. I argue that tax subsidies for charitable contributions affect health status only through charitable giving and hence, they are exogenous to health once income and other household and individual level characteristics are controlled for.
Therefore, following Gruber (2004) and Yörük (2013) , I exploit the variation in the subsidization of charitable giving in the United States over time, across income levels, and across states and use the tax subsidy rate of giving as an instrument for the propensity to give and the amount of contributions in order identify the relationship between charitable behavior and several health outcomes. I expect that the subsidy rate should be positively correlated with charitable giving but uncorrelated with the unobserved variables that may affect health outcomes after income and several observable factors that are associated with charitable behavior and health are controlled for.
The results imply that tax subsidies have positive spillover effects on overall health status and decrease the probability of suffering from several health problems. In particular, a one percentage point increase in the subsidy to charitable giving leads to a 0.004 point increase in the health index.
I also find that the estimated cross-price elasticity of health with respect to giving is −0.13 and that the tax subsidy for giving decreases the probability of suffering from a lung disease, emotional and psychological problems, and arthritis. Although tax subsidies have positive spillover effects on other health related problems such as high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, heart attack, and obesity, these effects are not statistically significant. These results are robust to the potential endogeneity of income and the possible existence of omitted factors that vary jointly by income level and year, jointly by state and year, and jointly by state and income level. Using the subsidy rate for charitable giving as an instrument for charitable behavior, I also document the relationship between charitable behavior and health. I find that a one log point increase in the amount of charitable contributions is associated with approximately 0.085 point increase in the health index.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a review of the existing literature which documents the relationship between charitable behavior and health. Section three presents the data and discusses the empirical methodology. Section four discusses the results and presents several robustness checks. Section five provides a discussion of policy implications and concludes.
2 Literature review
Tax subsidies and charitable behavior
Tax subsidies for charitable giving is part of the US tax system and of other tax systems around the world. On the one hand, this policy reduces tax revenues. On the other hand, it decreases the effective price of charitable donations and hence, encourage more of it. Suppose that t is the marginal tax rate faced by an individual. Each dollar given away to charity costs less than a dollar if this individual itemizes deductions in her tax return. Therefore, the effective price of a dollar worth of charitable donation is 1 − t for those who itemize deductions and 1 for those who do not (Andreoni, 2006) . If giving is price elastic, that is, if the price elasticity of giving is less than negative one, then the cost of allowing tax subsidies for charitable giving, measured in foregone tax revenues, is less than its benefit, measured by increased dollars of charitable giving. Therefore, as long as charitable giving is price elastic, tax subsidies for charitable giving are desirable.
There is a sizeable literature devoted to assessing the elasticity of charitable giving with respect to its after-tax price. Andreoni (2006) provides a detailed survey of theoretical and empirical studies in this literature. Earlier studies estimated elasticities of charitable giving with respect to its after-tax price of greater than minus one in absolute value (Clotfelter, 1985 and Steinberg, 1990 ). However, some recent studies find that charitable giving is price inelastic (Randolph, 1995 and Barrett, McGuirk, and Steinberg, 1997) . The main empirical problem that is widely-discussed in the literature is the endogeneity of the after-tax price of giving. The most common approach to address this problem is to use the first-dollar tax price as an instrument for the after-tax price. 4 In order to calculate the first-dollar price, one has to compute the reduction in taxes based on income, but assuming no existing charitable giving. An alternative approach is using state tax rates as an instrument for the after-tax price. However, Feenberg (1987) argues that differences in charitable subsidies across individuals are correlated with other factors that may determine tastes for charitable giving. Furthermore, states that adopt different tax rates may differ systematically in unobserved ways and these unobserved differences may also affect both the marginal tax rates and charitable behavior. In this paper, following Gruber (2004) , I rely on the extensive variation over 4 In the empirical analysis, I use the after-tax price in order to estimate the cross-price elasticity of health with respect to giving, Although not reported in the paper, estimating models using the first-dollar price instead of the after-tax price yields similar results.
time, within income levels, and within states to control for both income and fixed state differences in identifying the effect of tax subsidies for charitable giving.
Health benefits of charitable behavior
There is an extensive literature that links generosity and giving to others with better health out- (2008) show that individuals who devote more money to prosocial spending report greater happiness, whereas personal spending is unrelated to happiness.
However, to my best knowledge, none of the studies in the existing literature attempt to document the spillover effects of charitable subsidies on health. In this paper, I first document the spillover effects of tax subsidies for charitable giving on several health outcomes. Next, I show that the exogeneous variation in charitable subsidies can also be used to identify the relationship between charitable giving and health.
3 Data and empirical strategy argues that the quality of the COPPS data may be superior to that collected in other household surveys of charitable giving because of the PSID staff's experience in collecting data and the respondents' experience with the survey procedure. The unique feature of this data set is that it contains information on the self-reported health status of the household head and on several health problems that she has suffered from. Individuals' judgment about their health status may be subjective. However, previous studies have documented that people's perception of their own health is a good predictor of future health-care use and of mortality rates. For instance, Idler and Benyamini (1997) find that good-to-excellent self-reported health status is associated with lower risk of mortality, whereas McCallum et al. (1994) show that poor self-reported health status is a good predictor of subsequent illness and premature death. Furthermore, the main identifying assumption in the empirical analysis is that the tax subsidies for giving affect health only through charitable contributions. Therefore, the estimates from the empirical models should yield a consistent effect of tax subsidies on health unless people who misreport their health status systematically tend to sort themselves to lower or higher tax brackets. In the COPPS, the household heads were asked the following question: "Would you say your health in general is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?". The distribution of answers to this question is fairly broad. Table 2 shows that approximately 13% of household heads reported poor or fair, 27% reported good, and 60% reported very good or excellent health status. In line with earlier findings, when asked to rate their own health, female household heads, on average, report being in worse health than male household heads do. While the traditional explanation for this finding is that women's lower self-rated health is simply a reporting bias, a recent study suggests that women have a higher rate of chronic diseases and hence, more likely to report worse health than men do (Malmusi et al., 2012) . Similarly, Table 2 also shows that black or unmarried household heads tend to report being in worse health than white or married household heads do.
For the basic empirical analysis, I simply use the linear index formed by the responses to the health status question as a dependent variable with values 5 through 1. 6 Hence, in this basic analysis, I assume that there are equal impacts of each unit change in the self-reported health index. However, I also estimate alternative probit and ordered probit models that control for the ordinal nature of this variable. 
The after-tax price of giving

Empirical strategy
The basic empirical model follows that of Gruber (2004) and Yörük (2013) , who investigated the effect of charitable subsidies on religious behavior. Let Charity denote the probability of giving or the amount of charitable contributions. The relationship between charitable behavior and health can be expressed as follows:
where Health denotes the respondent's self-reported health status, X is a set of demographic control variables as presented in Table 1 , Inc is the natural logarithm of household income, State s is the full set of state effects, Y ear t is the set of year dummies, and ǫ is the residual disturbance term. In this model, if some unobservable characteristics of respondents that may be associated with their health status are also correlated with their giving behavior, then one cannot estimate the consistent effect of charitable behavior on health. The existing literature shows that tax subsidies for charitable giving positively affect charitable behavior. Therefore, charitable giving can be expressed as a function of income, observable characteristics of the households, and the rate of the tax subsidy that they are subject to. Suppose that tax subsidies for charitable giving affect health status only through the decision to give or the amount of charitable contributions. Then, in order to estimate the spillover effects of tax subsidies for charitable giving on health, one can estimate a reduced form model of the following form:
where Subs is the subsidy rate for charitable giving and v is the residual disturbance term that is assumed to be uncorrelated with X's, Inc, Subs, State s , and Y ear t . 10 This model controls for direct effects of income, state of residence, and time. However, as a robustness check, I also estimate models that control for the interactions of income, state, and year, and that address the possible endogeneity of income and the ordinal nature of the outcome variable. In order to estimate the relationship between charitable behavior and health, i.e., equation (1), I use two stage least squares (2SLS). In these models, I use subsidy rate for charitable giving as an instrument for the probability of giving and the amount of charitable contributions in the first stage.
Results
The effect of charitable subsidies on health status
In order to estimate the effect of tax subsidies for charitable giving on self-reported health status, I estimate the reduced form model in equation (2). The results from this main model are reported in the first column of Table 3 . For the full sample, health index increases by 0.004 units for each one percentage point subsidy to charitable giving. The mean of this variable is 3.67 with a standard deviation of 1.04. Therefore, the same magnitude of an increase in the subsidy is associated with approximately 0.1% improvement in health status from its mean or alternatively 0.4% improvement of a standard deviation in this variable. This effect is highly significant. Since, on average, female household heads report being in worse health than male household heads do, I
estimate separate regressions for female and male household heads. A one percentage point increase in the tax subsidy increases the health status of male heads by 0.003 points. Female heads are more responsive to charitable subsidies. For this group, the same magnitude of an increase in the tax subsidy is associated with a 0.005 unit increase in the health status index. Similar differences also exists between white and black household heads. While each percentage point increase in the tax subsidy improves the health status of white heads by 0.003 points, its effect on black heads is much larger. The health index for black heads raises by 0.005 points as a response to each percentage point increase in the tax subsidy for charitable giving. In the COPPS, while charitable giving is reported at the household level, the information on health status is collected at the individual level.
Therefore, I also estimate a separate regression for unmarried household heads. For this group, the 1 0 I also estimate models without controlling for the state fixed effects. The estimates from these models are very similar to those presented in this paper. This suggests that although there exists differences in the tax rates at the state level, the main source of identification in empirical models is the changes in federal tax laws over time.
effect of charitable subsidies on health remains to be positive and highly significant. In particular, for unmarried household heads, a one percentage point increase in the subsidy rate for charitable giving is associated with a 0.004 point increase in the health status. 11 The second column in Table 3 shows that the implied cross-price elasticity of health index with respect to giving is −0.13. 12 Similarly, for male household heads, a one percent increase in the aftertax price is associated with a 0.11% deterioration in health. The estimated cross-price elasticities of health with respect to charitable giving for female, white, black, and unmarried household heads are statistically significant and differ between −0.12 and −0.16. These results highlight the positive spillover effects of tax subsidies for charitable giving on health.
Robustness checks
Non-linearity of health index and income The results presented above relies on the implicit assumption that health status index is linear. This assumption may not be valid since these findings may be due to the changes in behavior at few particular points and may not reflect the changes throughout the distribution of different health status choices. I investigate this potential problem in Table 4 . In the first two columns, I report the marginal effect of the subsidy rate from five separate regressions that use dummies for each of the five possible responses to the health status question as dependent variables. The results clearly show that charitable subsidies have a significant impact throughout the distribution of health status. In particular, as a response to a tax subsidy for charitable giving, there is a sizeable rise in the odds of reporting an excellent health status and a sizeable decline in the odds of reporting a poor health status. When I estimate alternative models in which I use the log of the after-tax price of giving instead of the subsidy rate, I find similar results. When the after tax price of giving rises and giving becomes more expensive, the probabilities of reporting excellent or very good health decrease, whereas the probabilities reporting fair or poor health significantly increase. The last two columns in Table 4 report the results from an ordered probit model. These results also confirm the findings from the main model and show that charitable subsidies have a significant impact throughout the distribution of health status.
In the main empirical model, I assumed that the relationship between income and health sta- 1 1 Although not reported, I also estimate a model for single-person households. I find that for this group, as a response to a one percentage point increase in charitable subsidies, the health status of the individual improves by 0.003 points. 1 2 In order to estimate the cross-price elasticities, I estimate a model similar to equation (2) . In this reduced form model, I simply substitute the subsidy rate with the log of the after-tax price. The cross-price elasticity of health with respect to charitable giving is calculated using the coefficient estimates from this model. tus is linear. In alternative models, following Gruber (2004) , instead of using the survey reported income, I use a set of ten dummy variables for the deciles of the income distribution to control nonparametrically for income distribution effects on health. The first specification in Table 5 presents the results from these alternative models. The estimated coefficient on the subsidy rate suggests that health index increases by 0.003 units for each one percentage point subsidy to charitable giving. Similarly, the implied cross-price elasticity of health index with respect to giving is −0.11.
Compared with the results from the main models, these results are very similar.
Endogeneity of income Another potential concern with the main empirical model is the endogeneity of incomes to health status. For instance, if poor health status is associated with a reduction in time available to generate income, this could decrease the subsidy to charitable giving and impose a bias to main estimates. Alternatively, if those who report excellent or very good health status are more likely to earn more, this could raise the tax subsidy to charitable giving and impose a positive bias to the relationship reported in Table 3 . In order to address these potential concerns, I
follow two different approaches. I then use this predicted income to calculate marginal tax rates in the same fashion as with actual income. 13 The second specification in Table 5 reports the results from this approach. The impact of the charitable subsidies on health remains to be positive and highly significant and is also very similar to the comparable estimates from the main model. Furthermore, the cross-price elasticity estimate from this alternative model is −0.12, which is comparable to the elasticity estimate from the main model.
As an alternative approach, I follow Auten and Carroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002) and exploit the exogenous changes in the marginal tax rates for a given income. That is, I estimate the change in tax price for each individual by holding income constant in 2001 and estimate the tax price in each period at the same income level. Since income is held fixed across different time periods, changes in the tax price for each individual is due to changes in tax policy over time and the tax price change is truly exogenous with respect to each individual. The third specification in Table 5 reports the results from this alternative approach. The estimated coefficient on the subsidy rate implies that as a response to a one percentage point increase in the subsidy to charitable giving, health index rises by 0.004 points. Furthermore, in this model, the estimated cross-price elasticity of health with respect to giving is −0.13. These results are comparable with the estimates from the main model and suggest that the estimated effect of charitable subsidies on health is robust to the potential endogeneity of income.
Omitted factors The remaining specifications reported in Table 5 address the potential omitted factors that may be correlated with both charitable subsidies and health status. These models include interactions between income and year, state and year, and state and income as additional controls. The interaction between household income and year captures any potential national shocks that may have occurred over time and that may have a heterogenous effect on different income levels.
Inclusion of this interaction term slightly increases the estimated impact of charitable subsidies on health. The interactions between state and year dummies absorb any changes in states over time that has the same impact on all income levels. Again, inclusion of these interaction terms to the main model slightly increases the key coefficient on the subsidy rate for giving. The interaction dummies between income and each state dummy captures any differences in health status by income level across states. In this model, compared with the full sample results presented in Table 3 , the estimated impact of subsidy rate and the cross-price elasticity of health with respect to giving remain virtually the same. 14 
Alternative health related outcomes
In addition to overall health status, PSID contains information on several health problems that the household head may have suffered from. In particular, household heads are asked whether they have ever been diagnosed with one or more of the following: a stroke, high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart attack, heart disease, emotional or psychiatric problems, arthritis, and asthma. PSID also contains information on weight and height of the household head. Using this information, I calculate the body mass index (BMI) for each household head and identify those who are obese (BMI> 30). Given the positive effect of the tax subsidies on health, one would expect that the probability of suffering from one these health problems or being an obese should decrease 1 4 I also estimate an alternative model that includes all three interaction terms jointly. This model also yields comparable estimates with the main model.
as a response to an increase in the subsidy rate for giving. In Table 6 , I report the estimates from probit models in which the outcome variable is whether the household head suffered from one of these particular health problems. As expected, the estimated marginal effects of the subsidy rate for charitable giving on each individual health problem imply that charitable subsidies decrease the probability of suffering from a lung disease, emotional problems, and arthritis. Although tax subsidies have positive spillover effects on other health related problems such as high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, heart attack, and obesity, these effects are not statistically significant.
The effect of charitable giving on health
So far, I presented the results from several reduced form models that document the positive spillover effects of charitable subsidies on health. In this section, I investigate the relationship between charitable giving and health status using the subsidy rate for giving as an instrument for charitable behavior. I report results from two stage least squares (2SLS) models. In these models, the main identifying assumption is that subsidy rate for giving affects health status only through the probability of giving or the amount of charitable contributions. 15 Therefore, in order to be used as an instrumental variable, subsidy rate should satisfy two conditions. First, it must be a significant determinant of charitable behavior. Second, it must be uncorrelated with the unobserved covariates that may affect health status. Although one cannot test whether the second condition is satisfied, Table 7 clearly shows that in the first stage regressions, the tax subsidy rate for charitable giving is a significant determinant of the probability of giving and the amount of charitable contributions.
I start with investigating the impact of the probability of giving on health status. The results from the 2SLS models reported in Table 7 suggest that compared with those who do not give to charity, the health index of those who donate to a charitable organization is on average 0.83 points (79% of a standard deviation in the health index) higher. The relationship between the probability of giving and health remains to be positive and statistically significant for male, female, white, black, or unmarried household heads as well. Furthermore, compared with the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, which treat the probability of giving exogeneous, estimates from the 2SLS models are considerably larger.
The last three columns of Table 7 impact of the amount of charitable donations on health is relatively larger for female heads. As in the impact of the probability of giving on health status, compared with the estimates from the OLS models, the effect of the amount of charitable contributions on health status is considerably larger in the 2SLS models. Table 8 provides the results from similar models estimated for alternative health related outcomes. The results show that charitable behavior decreases the probability of being diagnosed with high blood pressure, lung disease, and arthritis significantly. Giving to charity has also positive impact on other health problems such as diabetes, cancer, heart attack, heart disease, emotional and psychological problems, and obesity. However, these effects are not statistically significant. 16 5 Discussion of results and conclusion in better health and a longer life expectancy. This finding implies that tax subsidies for charitable giving may have positive spillover effects on health. In this paper, I investigate this hypothesis using the COPPS, a unique data set that contains information on charitable contributions and several health outcomes.
I find that tax subsidies for charitable giving have positive spillover effects on overall health status and decreases the probability of suffering from several important health problems. In particular, my estimates suggest that the implied cross-price elasticity of health index with respect to giving is −0.13. Furthermore, charitable subsidies decrease the probability of suffering from a lung disease, emotional and psychological problems, and arthritis. Although tax subsidies reduce the probability of suffering from other health related problems such as high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, heart attack, and obesity, the effect of subsidies on these outcomes is not statistically significant. These results are also robust under several alternative models that control for the potential endogeneity of income and the possible existence of several omitted factors that vary jointly by state and income, by state and year, and by income and year.
I also use the tax subsidies for charitable giving as an instrument for identifying the direct relationship between charitable behavior and health. I find that compared with non-donors, the health index of charitable donors is on average 0.83 points higher and that a one log point increase in the amount of charitable contributions is associated with approximately 0.085 point increase in the self-reported health index. Giving to others also decreases the probability of suffering from high blood pressure, lung disease, and arthritis significantly.
The results of this paper highlight the positive externalities created by charitable subsidies and provide insights for alternative theoretical or empirical models which may investigate the indirect effects of charitable subsidies on other economic outcomes. The results of this paper also suggest that further expansions in the subsidy to charitable giving would increase the amount of charitable donations and at the same time, would also positively affect the health status of the individuals in the United States. Although, this paper provides some evidence that the improvement in the health status may be due to the positive effect of charitable subsidies on certain health problems, further research is needed to establish this relationship. Future work on similar topics would help further our understanding of the indirect impacts of tax subsidies for charitable giving and the relationship between giving behavior and related outcomes. In all models, the dependent variable is self-reported health status index. In column one, the effect of the tax subsidy for charitable giving on self-reported health status is reported. In column two, the elasticity of self-reported health status with respect to the after-tax price of giving is reported. All regressions include a set of control variables as presented in Table 1 and state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the household level reported in parentheses. The sign *** represents statistical significance at 1% significance level. Notes: Marginal effects are reported for all models for the full sample. The number of observations in all regressions is 17956. In columns one and three, the effect of the tax subsidy for charitable giving on self-reported health status is reported. In columns two and four, the effect of log(after-tax price of giving) on self-reported health status is reported. In the first two columns, results from probit models that are estimated for each individual health outcome are reported. In the last two columns, the dependent variable is self-reported health status index and results from ordered probit models are reported. All regressions include a set of control variables as presented in Table 1 and state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in parentheses. The signs *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Notes: Results from OLS and 2SLS models are reported. In all models, the dependent variable is self-reported health index. In 2SLS models, the instrumental variable is the rate of tax subsidy for charitable giving and the endogenous variable is whether the household donated to charity or the natural log of the amount of its charitable contributions. All regressions include a set of control variables as presented in Table 1 and state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in parentheses. The sign * and *** represents statistical significance at 10% and 1% significance level. 
